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1 Introduction
Governments in both developed and developing economies play an active role in labor mar-
kets to meet their growth and development objectives. In the case of India, the twin phenom-
enon of jobless growth and the growing casualization of the work-force has led to a vibrant
debate about the role of government policy in stimulating employment (see Kapoor (2017)
and Abraham (2017)). One particular intervention takes the form of the public sector being
the provider of jobs. We refer to this as employment targeting. For instance, public work-
fare programs are amongst the most common forms of anti-poverty programs in developing
countries. NREGS, the agship workfare government scheme in India employs several hun-
dred million people. In the US, the Works Projects Administration (WPA) started in 1935
was initiated in response to the Great Depression, and hired unemployed workers directly.
Large scale poverty reduction is a central policy objective of developing countries in Latin
America, Africa, and Asia, where employment guaranteed schemes have been at the centre
of an employment oriented approach to anti-poverty policy-making (Basu et al, 2009). More
recently, the aggressive response of scal policy in the nancial crisis of 2008 by developed
economies has sparked a burgeoning literature on the merits of counter-cyclical government
spending (see Rendahl (2016)).
In each of these cases, the general equilibrium e¤ects of policies that target employment
on overall unemployment remains a key research question. In the context of employment
guarantee schemes, like NREGS, a question that arises is that by leading to an increase
in wages, do employment guarantee schemes crowd out private sector employment ? In
a recent paper, Muralidharan, Niehaus, and Sukhtankar (2018) study the policy-relevant
general-equilibrium estimates of the total e¤ect on wages, employment, income, and assets of
increasing the e¤ective presence of NREGS. They show that a public employment guarantee,
by improving the outside option for workers, puts upward pressure on labor markets that
drives up wages and earnings. Basu et. al (2009) develop a formal model of an employment
guarantee scheme and show that such schemes introduce contestability in labor hiring, and
raise the reservation wage. Gomes (2015) characterizes a governments acyclical wage policy
that protects workers from business cycle uctuations. He argues that very high public sector
wages can create disincentives to private players for posting vacancies and can reduce overall
employment. In this context, he proposes an optimum level of the public sector wage which
maximizes welfare.
What is less understood in the literature however, is the impact of employment targeting
on the size of the informal sector in developing economies. We ll this gap in the literature.1
1There are only a handful of papers that use search and matching frameworks to study informal labor
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We build a simple model of a developing country labor markets characterized by search and
matching frictions. We show that public sector intervention in the labor market can lead to
an increase in the size of the informal sector. Because the informal sector is characterized by a
high ring rate and lower unemployment benets, employment targeting leads to an perverse
e¤ects on labor market outcomes. This is our main result. We also show that, under certain
parametric restrictions, an increase in the public sector hiring rate can increase employment
unambiguously. In particular, we nd it is possible that the private sector wage falls as a
result of an increase in the public sector hiring rate which leads to more job creation in the
private sector. This reverses the consensus ndings in the search and matching literature
which shows that an increase in public sector employment disincentivizes private sector
vacancy postings, as in the paper by Gomes (2015).
2 The Model
The economy is comprised of three innitely lived agents: rms, agents or workers, and
the government. Heterogeneous individuals are uniformly distributed according to their
abilities. Each individuals ability is indexed as i 2 (0; 1) where 0 is the lowest ability and
1 is the highest ability. Since agents do not have any other distinguishing features, they are
indexed as i. Firms present in the economy produce a single nal good which is consumed
by agents. We call a private rms production unit as the "private sector", denoted by P .
The governments production unit is termed as "public sector", denoted by G. Unemployed
agents are denoted by U: Agents are risk neutral and their utility comes only from consuming
the nal good.
Each agent has one unit of labour endowment, which he supplies inelastically in each
point of time. However, the labour market is characterized by frictions. Private sector
rms and agents face search and matching friction before commencing production activity.
Unemployed agents search for jobs irrespective of their abilities and can search for both
private sector and public sector jobs. Vacant rms looking for workers post a vacancy by
paying a vacancy posting cost, d > 0. Private sector rms and job seekers are matched
according to a Pissarides style matching function: m = m(u; v), where u is the number
of unemployed, and v is the number of vacant rms (Pissarides 2000). The function, m,
is homogeneous of degree one, concave, and increasing in each of its arguments. Hence,
m=u = m(1; );where   v=u, denotes the job nding rate, while m=v = m( 1; 1) is the
markets. See Albrecht et. al. (2009), Castillo and Montoro (2010), Maarek (2012), and Charlot et. al.
(2013). None of these papers however focus on the e¤ects on employment targeting.
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vacancy matching rate.2 Production starts in the private sector once a rm and a worker are
matched. Production follows a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology in the economy:
i.e., the ith ability agent produces i units of output. Firms get to know about their workers
ability once they are matched.
Unemployed agents get an amount, b > 0; which is an unemployment benet from the
government. Workers who are employed in the private sector get a per period wage, wi,
according to their ability. The ring rate in the private sector is given by  > 0. The rate at
which an unemployed agent nding a public sector job is given by  > 0. The parameter 
can be considered as the hiring rate of public sector. We assume that the government pays
a xed wage to its employees, w; irrespective of their ability. The ring rate in the public
sector is given by, ~. Therefore, in a small time span, t, an unemployed agent can get a
public sector job with a probability,   t, while a public sector worker can be red with
the probability, ~  t. Similarly, a private sector job match can break with probability,
t; within t. r is the discount rate in the economy. Finally, we assume that a job seeker
cannot get a net surplus from a public sector job and a private sector job simultaneously.
All the public/private job creation and job destruction rates follow a Poission process as in
Pissarides (2000).
We formalize the public sectors employment policy by the policy-tuple, { w; b; } and
call this the employment targeting policy of the government. Our main focus in this paper,
however, is on the parameter, ; and its e¤ect on unemployment and informalization.
2.1 Steady state
In this paper, we focus on characterizing the steady state. Let V ij denote the innite income
stream of the ith worker, where the state j = P;G; U: This implies that
rV iP = wi   (V iP   V iU) (1)
This implies that the ow value of a private sector job (or a lled vacancy), rV iP , equals the
wage from the private sector job (wi) plus the expected net surplus from being unemployed
if the private sector job is destroyed ((V iU   V iP )) : Analogously, the ow value of being
employed in the public sector is given by
rV iG = w   ~ (V iG   V iU); (2)
2m(1; ) t and m( 1; 1) t are the transition probabilities from being unemployed to employed and
vacant to a lled post, respectively, in the private sector, at a very small time interval t.
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and lends it to a similar interpretation to equation (1), except now, the wage in the public
sector is given by w; with the job destruction rate in the public sector given by ~: The ow
value of being unemployed is given by,
rV iU = b+m(1; ) (V
i
P   V iU) +  (V iG   V iU): (3)
which equates the ow value of being unemployed, rV iU ; to the level of the unemployment
benet, b; plus the net surplus from nding a job in either the private sector or public sector.
Since workers cannot work in both sectors simultaneously, there is no net surplus associated
with joint employment in both sectors.
Subtracting equation (3)from (1) yields
(r + +m(1; )) (V iP   V iU) = wi   b   (V iG   V iU): (4)
Likewise, subtracting equation (3) from (2), and solving for V iG   V iU yields,
V iG   V iU =
1
r + ~+ 
[ w   b m(1; )] (V iP   V iU): (5)
Equation (5) gives the net surplus of being employed in the public sector relative to the
net surplus of being employed in the private sector. Likewise, substituting equation (5) into
equation (4) and manipulating terms yields,
V iP   V iU =
w   b
m(1; )
+
r + ~+ 
m(1; )

(wi   b)m(1; )  ( w   b)(r + +m(1; ))
(r + )(r + ~+ ) +m(1; )(r + ~)

: (6)
Equation (6) expresses the net return of a productive matching to a worker. After a produc-
tive matching, workers receive V iP but at the cost of sacricing V
i
U :
We denote the value functions of innitely lived private rms as J iP and J
i
V , where P
stands for productive matching and v stands for a vacancy, respectively. The ow value of
a productively matched private rm is given by
rJ iP = (i  wi)  (J iP   JV ); (7)
and for a rm with a vacancy,
rJV =  d+m( 1; 1) (E(J iP )  JV ): (8)
Equation (8) contains the term E(J iP ): A vacant rm does not know about a workers ability
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prior to a successful match and therefore, does not know the exact return before the rm gets
matched with a worker. Instead, vacant rms use the information about expected returns
from a lled job, E(J iP ); to take a vacancy posting decision.
In equilibrium rms entry and exit freely in the market such that
JV = 0: (9)
Equation (8) therefore implies that
E(J iP ) =
d
m( 1; 1)
: (10)
Likewise, substituting JV = 0 into equation (7) and solving for J iP yields
J iP =
i  wi
+ r
(11)
which is increasing in the ability of the ith worker. Notice that for a private sector rm, the
net return from a productive matching is given by, (J iP   JV ).
2.2 Wage Bargaining
The Nash bargaining solution is the wi that satises
wi = argmaxwi(V
i
P   V iU) (J iP   JV )1 ; (12)
where  2 (0; 1) represents worker bargaining power. It is imperative to understand the
e¤ect of heterogeneous agents in the bargaining process. Since, each individual has an
unique ability, his corresponding wage is also unique. This has an important implication in
wage bargaining. If the workers were homogeneous then one individual could not a¤ect the
wage rate which is available outside ones particular job match, because there would be a
large number of similar agents participating in the labour market. One agent would be too
small to a¤ect the rest of the market. However, in the present set up with heterogeneous
ability, this argument does not hold. A matched worker knows that, ceteris paribus, any wage
decision in a particular matching is going to replicate in all possible productive matchings
because each agent is unique in their ability, i. In other words, a change in wi also changes
the agents outside option, V iU . This implies that,
@V iU
@wi
6= 0.
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The rst order maximization condition is given by


@V iP
@wi
  @V
i
U
@wi

J iP + (1  )

V iP   V iU
 @J iP
@wi
= 0: (13)
To obtain an expression for @V
i
P
@wi
  @V iU
@wi
; we di¤erentiate equation (6) to get
@V iP
@wi
  @V
i
U
@wi
=
r + ~+ 
(r + )(r + ~+ ) +m(1; )(r + ~)
: (14)
Substituting equation (14) and @J
i
P
@wi
from (11) and putting these into equation (13), we
obtain an expression for wi :
wi = [i + b(1  )] + ( w   b)(1  )
m(1; )

   +  m(1; )
r + ~+ 

(15)
Equation wi is increasing in the ability of the ith worker, although since our focus is on
employment targeting, we would like to know how an increase in ; the hiring rate of the
public sector, a¤ects the optimal wage. To see this, recall equation (13). Using equations
(1), (7), and (9), we can re-write (13) as
(1  ) V iP   V iU = (1  r@V iU@wi )(i  wi+ r )
wi   rV iU =

1   (i  wi)(1  r
@V iU
@wi
)
wi

1 +

1   (1  r
@V iU
@wi
)

= rV iU +

1   i(1  r
@V iU
@wi
):
Using equations (1), (2), and (3), it is easy to show that, r @V
i
U
@wi
= m(1;)
1+m(1;)+
: Using this, and
after a few algebraic manipulations, we obtain
wi = rV
i
U + (i  rV iU)
"
 1+
1++m(1;)
(1  ) +  1+
1++m(1;)
#
: (16)
The rst term on the right hand side, rV iU ; is the minimum compensation a worker
requires to give up search (Pissarides, 2000). On top of this, the worker requires a fraction
of the rent, or net surplus, that a productive match generates. It can be shown that if 
increases, then both rV iU (because a public sector job serves as an outside option for a private
sector worker) and the square bracketed term on the right hand side are increasing. However,
due to an increase in rV iU ; the term, i  rV iU , is falling, or the surplus itself is less. Since the
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proportionate share of the surplus accruing to the worker is more (because of the monopoly
power of the ith worker), the e¤ect of the fall in net surplus pulls the wage down, and gets
amplied. This means that an increase in  creates an ambiguous e¤ect on the wage.
2.3 Equilibrium
Recall that agents are distributed uniformly over the interval [0; 1]: Therefore, from equation
(11), we have
E(J iP ) =
Z 1
0
J iPdi =
Z 1
0
i  wi
+ r
di: (17)
Substitute out for wi in equation (17) using equation (16): Solving the integration makes
equation (17) free of i and wi: The only remaining endogenous variable in (17) is : Hence,
E(J iP ) =
1
2(+ r)
  1
(+ r)

b(1  ) + 
2

  ( w   b)(1  )
m(1; )

   +  m(1; )
r + ~+ 

(18)
Equating equation (10) and (18) implies,
d
m( 1; 1)
+
( w   b)(1  )
m(1; )(+ r)
(  ) = 1
2(+ r)
  1
(+ r)

b(1  ) + 
2

  ( w   b)(1  )
r + ~+ 
(19)
which implicitly solves for the value of :
Steady state unemployment happens when the ow out of unemployment equals the ow
into unemployment, i.e., u [m(1; ) + ] = (1  u)

+ ~

: This implies,
u =

+ ~

m(1; ) +  + + ~
(20)
2.4 Comparative Statics
We are interested in the impact of employment targeting, or the public sectors hiring ob-
jectives on the overall level of unemployment. To obtain this, we totally di¤erentiate both
sides of equation (19) with respect to  to obtain
d
d
=  
264( w   b)(1  )
r + ~+ 
2
375" m(1; )
(d  "m(1; ))  ( w   b)(1  )(1 + (  ) "m(1;) )
#
; (21)
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where "m(1; ) is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to ; i.e.,
@m(1;)
@

m(1;) :
The condition for d

d
> 0 is given by

   > "m(1; 
)

d  "m(1; )
( w   b)(1  )   1
 1
: (22)
We can interpret the above condition more precisely if we consider the class of matching
functions with constant elasticity. In this case, the right hand side of equation (22) will be a
constant in terms of d; w; b; ; and "m; which we denote by : Equation (22) can be written
as
 + (   ) > 0: (23)
Figure 1a and Figure 1b below shows that if the equilibrium value of ; or ; lies to the
right hand side or above (respectively) of the line given in (23), then d

d
> 0: Conversely, if
 lies to the left or below, then d

d
< 0: This leads to our rst proposition.
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Figure 1a:  versus  when  > 0
Figure 1b:  versus  when  < 0
Proposition 1 Consider a value  such that the equilibrium value of (= v
u
) lies above the
straight line, +( ) = 0: Employment targeting, or an increase in hiring by the public
sector (increase in ); increases , or reduces equilibrium unemployment, u: If  lies below
the straight line, then an increase in  leads to a fall in , or an increase in equilibrium
unemployment, u; if "m(1; ) is su¢ ciently large.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. Recall that the impact of  on wi is
ambiguous. Suppose a rise in  increases wi; then the return from a vacant post for a rm
falls. Hence, rms start leaving the market and the number of vacancies, v; falls, since in
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equilibrium, Jv = 0: This leads to a fall in m(1; ). If the fall in m(1; ) is large enough to
o¤-set the rise in ; then from equation (20), u can rise. On the other hand, if a rise in
 makes wi fall, then the return from vacancies rise, and more rms enter the market and
more vacancies are created. Both  and m(1; ) increase, and u falls. Equation (23) is the
su¢ ciency condition for the fall in u:
There is an important corollary to Proposition 1, which relates to the case when ( w b)!
0: In this case, the public sector wage is so low, that it is close to the per-period unemployment
benet, b: It is easily seen from equation (19) that the equation is independent of : This
implies that changes in  have no impact on ; or on the rate of getting a private sector
job and a private sector wage. This implies that an increase in  unambiguously reduces
u: Intuitively, ( w   b) is the net surplus from working in the public sector relative to being
unemployed. As the net surplus falls, the outside option (the public sector job) facing a
worker in the bargaining process to determine his wage is negligible. This is true for a rm
too. So the private sector o¤ers more vacancies. There is more matching. And this leads to
lower unemployment.
3 Informal Sector
In this section we extend the baseline model above to include an informal sector. Our main
goal is to derive conditions under which employment targeting by the public sector can lead
to an increase in the size of the informal sector. We assume that labor is divided into two
categories: formal and informal. As before, within the formal sector, there is a public sector
and a private sector, and their characterization remains the same.
The description of the informal sector is as follows. Private sector rms operate in
both the informal and formal sector (example, textiles, or leather goods). If they operate
in the informal sector, they pay a training cost, c; once they are matched with a worker.
After receiving the training, the productivity of all matched workers (in the informal sector)
becomes the same, and workers get a wage corresponding to their new productivity. Hence,
the heterogeneity in ability of the worker is not reected in the wage that they receive in the
informal sector. We assume that the ring rate is higher in the informal sector than in the
formal sector. For simplicity, we assume that the ring rate of the informal sector is 1. Firms
post vacancies unless the returns to posting vacancies becomes zero. When the returns from
posting a vacancy becomes zero, there is no incentive for rms to enter into the market. In
the informal sector, rms and job seekers match through the typical matching function used
in the previous section, except that here the outside option is, by assumption, bI < b.
In the formal sector, individual ability is uniformly distributed over [i; 1]; while in the
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informal sector, individual ability is distributed over [0; i]:3We solve for all endogenous
variables in the steady state. In addition, we also characterize the problem for the pivotal
worker, who is indi¤erent between working in the informal and formal sectors.
3.1 Labor market in the informal sector
Let V IU denote the value function corresponding to the innite income stream of an unem-
ployed worker in the informal sector (I): The value function does not include the subscript
i which corresponds to individual ability; as mentioned before, workers get a homogenous
return. Similarly, V IE is the value function corresponding to the innite income stream of an
employed worker in the informal sector. The ow values are given by
rV IU = bI +m(1; I)(V
I
E   V IU ) (24)
and
rV IE = wI   (V IE   V IU ) (25)
where I is the market tightness in the informal sector, and wI is the wage rate in the
informal sector.
Let J IE be the value function of matched rm, while J
I
V denotes the value function of a
vacant rm in the informal sector, i.e.,
rJ IE = (p  wI   c)  (J IE   J IV ) (26)
and
rJ IV =  d+m( 1I ; 1)(J IE   J IV ) (27)
where p > 0 is the constant productivity from a productive matching in the informal sector.
After a productive matching, rms pay the wage, wI ; and the training cost, c:
As before, in equilibrium JV = 0 due to the free entry condition. The wage in the
informal sector, like the private sector wage, is determined by Nash bargaining. However,
the di¤erence relative to the previous section is that in case of the informal sector, an
individuals di¤erential ability is not reected in their productivity. Hence, the wage in the
informal sector is the same for all workers. For the same reason, in this bargaining problem,
the assumption that one individual workers decision cannot change the outside option is a
valid one.4
3In the previous section, individual ability was uniformly distributed over [0; 1]
4This is a commonly made assumption in the literature on Pissarides type search and matching. However,
in the case of the formal private sector wage bargaining problem in the previous section, this assumption
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3.2 Wage Bargaining
The Nash bargaining solution is the wI that satises
wI = argmax
wI
(V IE   V IU )(J IE   J IV )1 :
The maximization exercise yields
 
V IE   V IU

= 
 
V IE   V IU + JEI

(28)
which implies
wI   rV IU = (p  c)  rV IU
or,
wI = (p  c) + (1  )rV IU : (29)
Equation (28) can be also be written as
V IE   V IU : =

1  J
I
E: (30)
Substituting
 
V IE   V IU

in equation (30) into equation (24), we obtain
rV IU = bI +m(1; I)

1  J
I
E: (31)
Since the free entry condition requires that J IV = 0; from equation (27), we obtain
J IE =
d
m( 1I ; 1)
(32)
Substituting the value of J IE from (32) into (31) yields
rV IU = bI +

1   Id: (33)
Putting this back into (29) yields,
wI = (1  )bI + (p  c+ Id): (34)
Hence, the optimal wage in the informal sector is a positive function of labor market tightness
was not valid.
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in the informal sector, I :What is noteworthy is that for a given I ; a rise in the training cost
leads to a fall in the informal sector wage. This is because a rise in training costs reduces
the surplus accruing to the informal sector rm, which responds by reducing its wage rate.
From equation (26), setting J IV = 0 implies J
I
E =
(p wI c)
1+r
: Setting this equal to the value
of J IE in (32) implies
(p  wI   c)
1 + r
=
d
m( 1I ; 1)
(35)
Equation (35) depicts a negative relationship between I and wI :On the other hand, equation
(34) depicts a positive relationship between I and wI : Figure 2 below depicts the two
equations. Their intersection yields the equilibrium values of wI and I : An interesting
implication is that as the training costs facing informal sector rms increases, as shown in
Figure 3, both curves shift. In particular, equation (35) shifts down/out, while equation
(34) shifts in. Hence, both wI and 

I fall. Intuitively, as c increases, e¤ective output from
a productive matching, p  c; falls in the informal sector. Since both rms and workers are
sharing their returns from the surplus, p  c; both their returns fall. Hence, facing J IV < 0;
rms exit the market, to ensure that J IV = 0 in equilibrium. As a result, both 

I and w

I
decrease.
Figure 2: Labor Market Equilibrium in the Informal Sector
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Figure 3: Impact of Training Costs on I and wI
3.3 The Formal Sector
Individuals from [i; 1] work in the formal sector. We determine i endogenously in equilib-
rium. As mentioned in the previous section, the wage in the formal sector is an increasing
function of an individuals ability (see equation (16)). Since the return from the informal
sector is independent of the ability of the worker (i.e., xed), an individual with higher ability
is incentivized to work harder in the formal sector. In essence, the formal sector here is not
di¤erent from the previous section, apart from the fact that the formal sector corresponds
to individuals with ability distributed over [i; 1]. As a result, equation (17) becomes
E(J iP ) =
Z 1
i
J iP
1  idi =
Z 1
i
i  wi
(+ r) (1  i)di: (36)
Recall that the expression for wi in the formal sector is given by (15). We proceed in steps.
First,Z 1
i
widi =

2
(1  i) + (1  i)

b(1  ) + ( w   b)(1  )
m(1; )

   +  m(1; )
r + ~+ 

:
Therefore,Z 1
i
(i  wi)di = 1  
2
(1  i)2   (1  i)

b(1  ) + ( w   b)(1  )
m(1; )

   +  m(1; )
r + ~+ 

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Substituting the value of
R 1
i(i  wi)di above into equation (36) and simplifying yields,
E(J iP ) =
1
(+ r)

1  
2
(1 + i) 

b(1  ) + ( w   b)(1  )
m(1; )

   +  m(1; )
r + ~+ 

(37)
Equating the value of E(J iP ) =
d
m( 1;1) from (10) with the expression given above in equation
(37), we obtain
d
m( 1; 1)
=
1
(+ r)

1  
2
(1 + i) 

b(1  ) + ( w   b)(1  )
m(1; )

   +  m(1; )
r + ~+ 

or,
d
m( 1; 1)
+
( w   b)(1  ) (  )
m(1; ) (+ r)
=
1
(+ r)

1  
2
(1 + i)  b(1  )  ( w   b)(1  )
r + ~+ 

:
(38)
Equation (38) depicts the equilibrium relationship between  and i which guarantees a rms
free entry and exit. Here,  and i are positively related, as long as  > : If i increases,
to clear the labor market, more rms enter and increase the number of vacancies. This is
because a rmsentry decision is based on the expected return from a lled post. Since i;
increases, and the upper bound of ability is 1; the average productivity in the formal sector
must rise. In other words, more able individuals are left, and therefore average productivity
must be higher.
Since we have two endogenous variables ( and i), we need another equation to pin down
both variables. We turn to this in the next section.
3.4 Equivalence of Formal and Informal Sectors
In the previous sub-section, we assumed the existence of an interior solution where the work
force could be partitioned between the formal and informal sectors. Therefore, there must
be a marginal worker who is indi¤erent between joining the informal and formal sectors.
We denote the marginal worker as i: Since the ability of every individual in the population
is indexed by i, the marginal workers ability is indexed by i: Therefore, the ow value
of search for a job in the formal sector for the marginal worker is rV i

U : Likewise, in the
informal sector, it is given by rV IU : Since the individual with i
 ability is indi¤erent between
joining both the informal sector and formal sector, it follows that
V i

U = V
I
U : (39)
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Using equation (3) and equation (5), we can determine rV i

U as a function of (V
i
P   V iU ) :
rV i

U = b+
( w   b)
r + ~+ 
+
m(1; )(r + ~)
r + ~+ 
(V i

P   V i

U ): (40)
Wage determination in the formal sector is determined from: (V i

P  V iU ) = 1  (i wi)(
@V iP
@wi
 
@V iU
@wi
): Using equation (14) in this expression yields
(V i

P   V i

U ) =

1   (i
   wi)
"
r + ~+ 
(r + )(r + ~+ ) +m(1; )(r + ~)
#
: (41)
We now have (V i

P  V iU ) in terms of (i wi): Equation (15) already solves for the optimal
wi; and therefore wi : So we can get an expression for (i
   wi ): Using equation (15) and
equation (40), rV i

U is determined by
rV i

U = b+
( w   b)
r + ~+ 
+
m(1; )(r + ~)
(r + )(r + ~+ ) +m(1; )(r + ~)
24(i   b) + ( w   b)(   )
m(1; )
  ( w   b)
r + ~+ 

35 :
(42)
Equation (33) determines V IU : Therefore, both the right hand side and left hand side in the
equivalence equation, (39), are now a function of  and i: Using equation (33) and (42), we
obtain

1 + (r+)(r+
~+)
m(1;)(r+~)

(i   b) + (   )( w   b)
m(1; )

+
( w   b)
(r + ~+ )
241  
1 + (r+)(r+
~+)
m(1;)(r+~)
35 = 
1   Id
(43)
3.5 Equilibrium
Equations (38) and (43) denote the labor market equilibrium and equivalence equations,
respectively. The solution of these two equations solve for i and  endogenously. However,
equation (43) depicts an ambiguous relationship between  and i: This makes the conclusion
unclear.
3.6 Comparative Statics
We focus on an analytical special case to nd whether employment targeting can have an
impact on the composition of the workforce between the informal and formal sectors. Later,
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we consider a numerical example that shows that our result is more general. We consider
the special case where ( w   b) ! 0: Note that I has already been solved in equation (34)
and (35). Equation (43) now shows a negative relationship between i and . Equation (38)
has a positive intercept in the i and  plane, for ( w   b) ! 0: This ensures an interior
equilibrium for i and , as shown in Figure 4. In Figure 4, if the government decides to
increase its hiring rate (increase  ), or target a higher employment rate (when ( w b)! 0);
equation (38) remains unchanged, but (43) shifts upward. In this case, market tightness
in the formal sector, and the size of the informal sector - i and   respectively, both rise.
This is because an increase in the market tightness of the formal sector results in a rise in
the rate of obtaining a job in the formal sector. We summarize this result in terms of the
following proposition.
Figure 4: Impact of Employment Targeting on Size of the Informal Sector.
Proposition 2 Suppose ( w   b) ! 0: Then an increase in ; or more public sector hiring,
increases 1) market tightness in the formal sector () and 2) the size of the informal sector
(i).
The intuition is as follows. When ( w b)! 0; the per-period (net) return to public sector
employment tends to zero. If the public sector expands, the marginal job seeker, i; who was
originally getting the same return as if he was in the informal sector nds it detrimental to
stay in the formal sector, since staying in this sector is not remunerative. However, once i
increases,  starts increasing to clear the market because the average productivity in the
formal sector is higher, and more rms enter into the market. This creates more vacancies,
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which means  increases. Hence, as  increases, provided that ( w   b)! 0, both  and i
increase. Thus, the size of the informal sector increases.
There is an interesting implication with training costs. As c increases, the opposite
happens (the size of the informal sector falls). This is because I falls and this shifts equation
(43) backwards although equation (38) remains unchanged. As I falls staying in the informal
sector becomes less remunerative because the rate of getting a job is lower. So i falls. To
clear the labor market,  also falls.
3.7 Numerical Exercise
The assumption of ( w b)! 0 is a special case. What happens if ( w b) is su¢ ciently small
but non-zero ? We show that the results of Proposition 2 go through, at least locally, using
arbitrary parameters that allows for a su¢ ciently small w   b > 0. 5 We utilize a matching
function of Cobb-Douglas form: aua1v(1 a1). Table 1 below summarizes the parameter values.
Figures 5, and 6 characterize the equilibrium in informal and formal markets respectively.
Figure 7 examines the e¤ect of change in  on labor market outcomes.
No. Parameters Values
1 d 0.2
2 a 0.5
3 a1 0.65
4 b 0.39
5 bI 0.1
6  0.35
7 w 0.4
8 c 0.1
9  0.15
10 ~ 0.05
11 r 0.15
Table 1: Parameter Values
Figure 5, generated using equations (34) and (35), shows an interior solution correspond-
ing to the parameters for the informal sector where w > b. We assume  = 0:5 in the baseline
case. The numerical solution of I is 0.14. While this number is arbitrary, it says that of
5We are unable to check whether Proposition 2 holds for large values of w   b > 0. We plan to address
this in a future draft of the paper.
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all the job seekers in the informal sector, at most only 14% of them can be matched with
vacancies in the informal sector.
Figure 5: Equilibrium in the Informal Sector
Figure 6, generated using equations (38) and (43), characterizes equilibrium in the formal
market. For  = 0:5, the solution for  and i are shown to approximately be  = :5 and
i = :5: This means that approximately half the population works in the informal sector,
and the other half works in the formal sector.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium in the Formal Sector
Now, we increase the government hiring rate, ; to 0:8. Figure 7 below shows that for
a small but non zero ( w   b) a higher  leads to an increase in both ; i consistent with
the result in Proposition 2. As i increases, the size of the informal sector increases. This
increases ;which means compared to the earlier case (where earlier roughly half of the job
seekers could get a job in the formal sector), now more than half can get a job in the formal
sector since the return from posting a vacancy in the formal sector has increased. However,
since the informal sector is characterized by a higher ring rate (1); and lower unemployment
benets, the rise in  leads to a perverse labor market outcome.
Figure 7: E¤ect of Change in the Public Sector Hiring Rate
4 Conclusion and Policy Implications
Many governments as part of their growth and development objectives, play an active role
in labor markets. Such interventions come in the form of setting a minimum wage, providing
unemployment benets, and directly hiring workers. We refer to this as employment target-
ing. In the context of a simple search and matching friction model with heterogenous agents,
we show that the propensity for the public sector to target more employment can increase
the unemployment rate in the economy and leads to an increase in the size of the informal
sector. Employment targeting can therefore have perverse e¤ects on labor market outcomes.
We also nd it is possible that the private sector wage falls as a result of an increase in the
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public sector hiring rate which leads to more job creation in the private sector. This reverses
the consensus ndings in the search and matching literature which shows that an increase
in public sector employment disincentivizes private sector vacancy postings.
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